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Chapter 2
ASSESSING THE NEGOTIATION 
EXPERIENCE: QUICK ACCESSION  
OR GOOD REPRESENTATION?
Tomislav Maršić*
ABSTRACT
This article examines the negotiation phase on two levels: First, 
it assesses domestic organising, the processes of adopting a negotiating 
position and the relevant actors involved. By a comparative analysis of 
the experiences from Estonia, Slovenia and Hungary, “best manage-
ment” practises will be condensed. These are subsequently applied to 
Croatian negotiation management in order to identify potential prob-
lems. In a second step, the findings will be put into the wider context 
of the political consequences of the negotiation strategy, providing rec-
ommendations for alternative modes of domestic organising. It will be 
argued that the Croatian negotiation structure is streamlined in order to 
match ambitions to complete negotiations in a very short time. How-
ever, this institutional set-up concentrates one-dimensionally on execu-
tive expertise and reinforces problems in domestic representation and 
legitimisation. It therefore fails to accommodate to new strategic devel-
opments like enlargement-fatigue in the European Union and “euro-fa-
tigue” in Croatia.
Key words:
European Union, Croatia, accession negotiations, negotiation team, 
democratic deficit
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INTRODUCTION
The start of accession negotiations is one of the most complex 
parts of the accession process to manage politically, because it is the 
moment when “political realities begin to sink in” (Grabbe, 2003:4)i. 
This paper investigates the negotiation phase, attempting to clarify the 
processes involved and Croatia’s institutional responses, and also anal-
yses possible problems. The first part of the paper examines the proc-
ess of the accession talks, since awareness of the structural conditions 
of negotiations is a prerequisite for further analysis. Subsequently, a 
comparative analysis of past institutional set-ups is provided, focusing 
on individual advantages and shortcomings.ii The Croatian negotiation 
structure will be subsequently projected against these findings, identi-
fying potential problem areas in the domestic communication and deci-
sion-making chain.iii The paper concludes with recommendations con-
cerning the lay-out of the negotiation strategy and alternative modes of 
domestic organisation.
Accession negotiations from the perspective of the acceding 
country are governed by different underlying norms.iv In this article 
attention is drawn to the conflicting norms “integration speed”, “demo-
cratic control” and “stakeholder participation” which played a promi-
nent role in the experiences of the countries of the last enlargement 
wave. Their realisation poses a dilemma to policy-makers in weigh-
ing normative arguments against each other in order to find a trade-off 
between these contradictory goals. 
As for instance increasing “democratic control” would require 
the inclusion of more actors (e.g. the parliament) into the negotiation 
structure, this would have adverse effects on the “integration speed” as 
coordination processes become more complex. At the same time, incre-
asing the participation of stakeholders in order to raise expertise and 
networking skills runs at the cost of “democratic control” as these ac-
tors are not elected representatives of the public.
Against this background it will be argued firstly that the Croatian 
negotiation structure is streamlined in order to fit ambitions to complete 
negotiations in record time. This institutional set-up however, concen-
trates one-dimensionally on executive expertise, reinforcing problems 
in domestic representation and legitimisation and also failing to accom-
modate to new strategic developments like enlargement-fatigue in the 
EU and “euro-fatigue” in Croatia. This leads to the conclusion that stra-
tegic changes in the domestic negotiation set-up should be impleme-
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nted, in order to ensure better representation by the parliament and a 
less pressured approach to accession – a project which means nothing 
much less than the complete recreation of Croatia’s political system.
ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS:  
A PROCEDURAL OUTLINE
Accession negotiations are “bilateral, state-level negotia-
tions”, with the key interlocutors “at home” being the chief negotiators 
and their teams, and a relatively small number of ministers (Grabbe, 
2001:4). They are not so much political but rather technical talks in a 
sense of “negotiating harmonisation” (Lajh, 2003:9). The strategic ba-
sis are the Agenda 2000 program for enlargement (European Council, 
1999) and the Accession Partnership (Commission, 2005a), concretely 
specified in the (yearly) National Program for the Integration of the Re-
public of Croatia into the EU (MFAEI, 2006).
Real negotiations in the sense of bargaining take place only in 
three contexts. The largest part of the actual negotiations is carried out 
“at home” by finding a national position in concert with the societal 
actors affected.v Second, according to the principle “nothing is agreed 
until everything is agreed” in the end phase of the process, a complete 
package deal has to be achieved with the implication of budgetary is-
sues. In addition, the candidate has informally to engage in negotiations 
on open bilateral issues with the concerned member states. Throughout 
the whole negotiation process the role of public opinion must not be 
underestimated because it can have a significant impact on a member 
(or candidate) country’s negotiating position.
In its strategy paper, the Commission (2002:13) states that “ac-
cession negotiations are based on the principle that candidates accept 
the acquis and apply it effectively upon accession”. Some exemptions 
(“transition periods”) are allowed but they have to be “limited in time 
and scope and be accompanied by a plan clearly defining stages for the 
application of the acquis”. In very rare cases so called “derogations” 
were put in place which allowed the accessing country long-lasting 
exemptions from specific regulations of the acquis.
Although the Commission negotiates on behalf of the mem-
ber states, all decisions (such as opening and closing of chapters) have 
to be made unanimously by the Council. Still, the Commission plays 
a very important role in negotiations, as its proposal to the Council 
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often predetermines the latter’s “Common Position” – the “answer” to 
the negotiation position of the candidate. 
Usually two position exchanges complete one chapter, although 
more difficult issues can demand three (or rarely more) rounds. A chap-
ter is closed only preliminarily until all chapters are negotiated. In con-
trast to the last enlargement wave, the closure of chapters is now seen to 
depend to a greater extent on the implementation of their contents and 
not so much on their mere adoption. This qualitative difference means 
that Croatia will have to work more thoroughly in closing the chapters, 
while it gives the EU wider leeway in rating Croatia’s progress. 
The enlargement sessions are held at intergovernmental (or: 
negotiation-) conferences twice during an EU presidency, one time at 
the level of deputies (Committee of the Permanent Representatives on 
the EU side, chief negotiators on side of the candidate) and one time 
at the level of ministers. In particular, focus is placed on the progress 
achieved by the candidate countries which is monitored by the Com-
mission through progress reports and peer reviews.
Since the EU is a rigid negotiating partner with very limited 
space to manoeuvre, the negotiation process is qualified by “condition-
ality” (the need to meet EU requirements) and “hierarchy” (Grabbe, 
1999). It is characterised by a structural asymmetry in bargaining pow-
er in favour of the EU, which in the past led to the label “policy-tak-
ing instead of policy-making” (Payne, 2003:34). As this asymmetry is 
not only caused by the overwhelming negotiation power of the EU, but 
also by the weaknesses of the candidate countries themselves, particu-
lar importance is attached to the organisation of the negotiation team. 
Accordingly, the next section will deal with the question of how three 
countries, Estonia, Slovenia and Hungary, organised their management 
with respect to leading negotiations on EU accession.
NEGOTIATION MANAGEMENT  
STRUCTURES IN COMPARISON
Estonian negotiation management
Estonian negotiation management was characterised by a com-
paratively flexible and informal structure with a strong overview from 
the central government (Payne, 2003:30). The negotiation structure 
was decentralised, with strong line ministries being responsible for the 
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harmonisation of law, the implementation of the accession agenda and 
advising the relevant working group of the negotiation team (Drechsler 
[et al.], 2002). In the course of negotiations, team leadership shifted 
from the foreign minister to the prime minister, who took over the man-
agement of the accession process shortly before the start of the negotia-
tions. This led to a floating centre of policy coordination, split between 
the prime minister’s State Chancellery and the Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs.vi This development also partly originated from the fact that rela-
tions with the EU started as international relations and evolved into do-
mestic affairs. 
The prime minister directed the whole process and was respon-
sible for coordination at the highest level at a weekly and informal “Eu-
ropean meeting” at which the cabinet discussed EU issues. This coordi-
nation role varied to a large extent by the self-definition of the respec-
tive government and its system and was rather the result of situational 
factors than a planned move.vii A newly established cabinet committee 
at ministerial level (Commission of Ministers for EU Affairs) acted as 
a discussion body for preparing negotiating positions to be adopted in 
government (Brusis [et al.], 2000:5). It was chaired by the prime minis-
ter and consisted of the core ministers.
The Office of European Integration was a structural unit of the 
State Chancellery, subordinate to the prime minister; it coordinated na-
tional preparations, mainly providing policy cooperation between the 
line ministries. The Office chaired the Council for Senior Civil Serv-
ants which prepared and approved the presented material and acted as 
a coordinating body, providing solutions to more complex inter-minis-
terial issues.
The foreign minister’s Bureau for Negotiations was responsi-
ble for overall process related coordination and synchronisation of the 
work of the Negotiations Delegation and the working groups. In the 
beginning of the process it channelled all communication between the 
national and the EU level until this was deemed to be counterproduc-
tive as it led to time lags and weak contacts between the line ministries 
and the EU.
The role of the parliament was to provide acceptance and to rub-
berstamp the government’s EU policy. The European Affairs Commit-
tee had twelve members from all political parties, in addition to mem-
bers from all the standing committees.
The mission acted as a vertical channel of information between 
the EU and the domestic government and hosted attachés from most 
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ministries, which gave direct tasks to their respective officials. Nev-
ertheless, the mission’s relations with interest groups remained weak 
throughout the process.
Figure 1 Negotiation structure of Estonia
EU Institutions
European Commission 
Directorate General Enlargement
The Council of Ministers 
Working group for Enlargement
Mission of Estonia 
to the EU
Prime minister and his 
State Chancellery
Office of European Integration
Council 
of Senior 
Civil 
Servants
Line ministries
Units for EU/international 
affairs
Negotiation delegation
15 Negotiators 
33 Working groups
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Bureau for Negotiations
Parliament
European Affairs Committee 
Joint Parliamentary Committee
Consultative 
Committee 
(NGOs)
Government
Commission of  
Ministers 
for EU Affairs
policy coordination
negotiating position flow after adoption
draft position flow before adoption
formal communication
informal communication
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One of the main lessons of the Estonian experience was that 
the smoothness of the overall coordination was dependent on the gene-
ral quality of personal contacts at the top of political decision-making 
structures. Of crucial importance was the direct access of the leader of 
the Office of European Integration to the prime minister for the author-
isation of resolving inter-ministerial conflicts. The particular success 
factors of the Office as the main horizontal coordination body were its 
flexibility, small size, openness and speediness in decision-making.
The decentralised approach with strong line ministries helped to 
avoid creating “islands of excellence” privileging the part of the staff 
dealing with EU issues leaving the rest with little expertise. At the same 
time the decentralised system needed very effective coordination as it 
was at risk of single actors avoiding dealing with issues that could be 
handled by somebody else.
The above mentioned dual character triggered problems in the 
exchange of information as some ministerial officials complained about 
the need for double reporting – to the prime minister’s State Chancel-
lery and to the Foreign Affairs Ministry. In this sense the Estonian exa-
mple shows that the establishment of informal contacts sometimes 
proved to be necessary, while at the same time it was recognised that 
they produce plenty of unrecorded information, which are lost to the 
organisation when the specific person leaves.
Slovenian negotiation management
Slovenian negotiation management was characterised by high 
formalisation and high transparency as a consequence of far-reaching 
integration of societal stakeholders and parliament.viii The decision to 
join the EU was supported by a strong societal and political consensus 
and did not generate huge controversy at the national level. Europe-
an integration meant a gradual “internalisation” of EU matters as “do-
mestic matters”, as well as putting the relevant horizontal and vertical 
coordination structures into place (Fink-Hafner, 2002). The decision to 
set up the independent Government Office for European Affairs (see 
below) showed that the key actors did not want to deal with EU inte-
gration in a traditional diplomatic sense and put an end to the informal 
coordinating role of the Foreign Ministry.
The negotiating team was explicitly established to ensure the 
prevalence of expertise over political or sectoral interest – one core cri-
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terion for staff recruitment was the absence of any affiliation to a po-
litical party. The team was responsible for the drafting of negotiating 
positions and consisted of thirty-one working groups headed by senior 
officials from the relevant ministry or government institution. Negotiat-
ing positions were co-ordinated at meetings of all working groups and 
formulated with extensive support from the relevant ministries. Subse-
quently, the draft positions were submitted to the government and the 
parliament for approval. All negotiating positions were fully published.
The prime minister was not very attentive to day-to-day issues 
but focused on strategic matters. He kept constant contact with the 
key actors, particularly the relevant ministers at the weekly “European 
Meeting” and resolved inter-ministerial conflicts.
The bulk of the policy coordinating work was carried out by 
the Government Office for European Affairs, led by a minister with-
out portfolio. While at the beginning it was set up within the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, in course of negotiations it became gradually inde-
pendent.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs channelled the document flow 
between Ljubljana and Brussels through the Mission of Slovenia to the 
EU. The mission’s experts were predominantly recruited from the line 
ministries and provided analysis and technical support. The Embassy 
of Slovenia to Belgium played a rather informal role in the emerging 
network of the Slovenian Business and Research Association. The lat-
ter proved to be an important channel of information and was financi-
ally supported by two ministries.
The Parliament had the tasks of aligning Slovenia’s legislation 
with the acquis and debating as well as adopting the proposed negotiat-
ing positions after they were discussed by the Parliamentary Commit-
tee on Foreign Policy. The Commission for European Affairs engaged 
in public debate and coordinated EU issues within the Parliament as a 
whole.
Throughout the accession process, the line ministries remained 
the main centres of the articulation of national positions, while the 
main strategic questions fell within the responsibility of the prime min-
ister. The foreign minister acted as formal chief negotiator and set the 
political guidelines while the “European minister” held rather techni-
cal meetings on the progress of the negotiations. Despite the central 
position of the Government Office for European Affairs, the Slovenian 
negotiation structure developed a multitude of centres while the line 
ministries remained in the lead in the formulation of negotiating posi-
tions.
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Figure 2 Negotiation structure of Slovenia
Embassy to Belgium
Business and Research 
Associations
EU Institutions
Parliament
Committee for Foreign Policy
Commission for European
Affairs
Mission of the 
Slovenia to the EU
Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs
Prime 
 minister
Government
Line 
ministries
Negotiation team
10 Negotiators 
31 Working groups
policy coordination
negotiating position flow after adoption
draft position flow before adoption
formal communication
informal communication
European Commission 
Directorate General Enlargement
The Council of Ministers 
Working group for Enlargement
Government Office for 
European Affairs
Source: Fink-Hafner [et al.], 2002; Brusis [et al.], 2000; author´s illustration
38
The formal communication channelled through the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs at times proved to be too rigid and gradually led 
to complementary informal channels of communication, especially be-
tween state actors and EU bodies in Brussels. The contacts of the Slov-
enian Mission to the EU facilitated quicker response to EU demands 
and became even more significant after accession.
Hungarian negotiation management
The Hungarian accession negotiations were supported by a 
broad domestic consensus for acceding to the EU in general and for 
the negotiating positions in specific (Ágh [et al.], 2003). After a change 
of government in 1998, the negotiation management saw a centralised 
structure with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the core with very lit-
tle involvement of outside parties or interest groups (Payne, 2003:31)ix. 
The significance of the ministry’s leadership was a direct consequence 
of the relatively minor involvement of the “remote” prime minister. The 
cabinet seldom discussed accession management in detail – the prime 
minister was usually only involved in issues with significant impact 
on daily politics. The ministers were briefed on the negotiations by the 
foreign minister and handled the details of the policy issues. 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs coordinated vertical relations 
with the EU, led the negotiation delegation and reported to the govern-
ment and the parliament while at the same time it was host to the cen-
tral bodies in the management of EU business.
The most important such body was the State Secretariat for 
Integration which became the centre for government decisions as well 
as single process and policy coordinator of the work of the line minis-
triesx. The Secretariat was headed by a state secretary, who was directly 
responsible to the minister. It chaired the Inter-ministerial Committee 
for European Integration, which was responsible for coordination at the 
level of senior civil servants. It was composed of expert groups estab-
lished according to the chapters of the acquis and headed by state sec-
retaries leading the European integration departments in the line min-
istries.
The negotiation delegation, chaired by the foreign minister, was 
the formal body charged with handling the accession negotiations. It 
had twelve permanent members from the Secretariat and senior civil 
servants representing the most important ministries and state agencies. 
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Most of the actual negotiations were carried out in an informal way 
through meetings with staff members and ambassadors of the European 
Commission and the permanent representatives of the member states. 
The chief negotiator used a variety of personal contacts with his negoti-
ation counterparts in Brussels and prepared reports for the government 
based on his assessment of the situation on the spot.
Figure 3 Negotiation structure of Hungary
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In the so called “European Integration Council” the foreign min-
ister held regular consultations with representatives from trade unions, 
employers’ organizations, chambers of commerce, etc. (The Hungarian 
Quarterly, 2001). All ministers were obligated to consult economic and 
social partners when they formulated positions on matters within their 
competence.
A Parliamentary Committee on European Integration Affairs 
was established, which had the tasks of monitoring the harmonisation 
of Hungary’s laws with the acquis and raising public awareness (Bes-
senyey Williams, 2000:13). The committee lacked expert staff and the 
financial resources to fulfil these tasks and was one of the least influen-
tial standing committees in parliament – the idea of transforming it to 
a grand committee was rejected by Prime Minister Orbán. The Parlia-
ment as a whole was not able to perform as a communication channel 
for organised interests (Ágh, 1999:843).
The principle of “speaking with one voice” resulted in all com-
munication flows passing through the Secretariat thus rendering the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, the head of the Secretariat and the chief 
negotiator the key players. Although the leadership of the Secretari-
at provided guidance in the process of accession, the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs was but a line ministry and as such neither authorized nor 
empowered to resolve inter-ministerial conflicts. At the same time the 
“remote” approach of the prime minister depoliticised and profession-
alised the process (ibid, 107).
CROATIAN NEGOTIATION MANAGEMENT: 
A VIEW FROM CROSS NATIONAL 
COMPARISON
The Croatian negotiation structure is, like Hungarian manage-
ment, highly centralised and is dominated by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and European Integration (Vlada RH, 2005a).xi The structure is 
characterised by a high concentration of procedural and political power 
on a limited number of persons at strategic points with a high level of 
control.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration is an 
amalgam of the former Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the former Min-
istry of European Integration, unified in March 2005 in an ad-hoc de-
cision. An interviewee reported that since unification, the ability to co-
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ordinate, in the sense of pushing line ministries to draft the necessary 
legislation, had deteriorated since the speed of legislative harmonisa-
tion declined. At the same time civil servants responsible for the co-
ordination of the EU pre-accession funds reported considerable com-
plications in working processes due to the handling of essentially two 
ministries. Further critics claim that organising accession by the Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs instead of an extra-resort ministry would send out 
the wrong message (expert interview). This is consistent with experie-
nces from Slovenia and Estonia, the former having set up a governmen-
tal body led by a minister without portfolio and the latter seeing a shift 
of power from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the prime minister in 
course of accession negotiations.
The minister holds a powerful role as she is directly responsi-
ble for leading direct talks within the “State Delegation” while simul-
taneously chairing the central policy coordinating body (Coordination). 
The weekly-convening Coordination consists of all ministers, the chief 
negotiator and the negotiator of the respective field of discussion (with-
out a vote). It is responsible for coordinating the negotiation team and 
the line ministries and decides by majority voting. The Coordination 
tackles issues for which no solution has been found at the level of sen-
ior civil servants (expert interview).
In view of the experience of Hungary, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (chair in the Coordination), being only a line ministry, might 
well lack the authority effectively to find proactive solutions in inter-
ministerial disagreements. In countries with a top policy coordination 
structure at senior civil servant level enjoying direct connection to the 
(prime) minister (e.g. Slovenia), establishment of the coordination at 
ministerial level is not an uncommon choice in the context of the ne-
gotiation structures evaluated here, but in terms of transparency and 
stability it is not necessarily the best option. A politicised coordination 
may work well within an environment of broad domestic support, but 
can easily be destabilised when this consensus fails. However, it has to 
be acknowledged that some degree of political control has to be main-
tained as “negotiations between bureaucracies do not necessarily con-
tribute to the development of shared values as a basis for new govern-
ance structures” (Grabbe, 2003:4). In this context the probably most in-
teresting finding from the comparative analysis is that the performance 
of the similarly streamlined management structure in Hungary with re-
spect to decision making on a negotiating position was comparatively 
slow (Payne, 2003:33) while relatively quick in Slovenia, where the 
parliament as an additional veto player confirmed and adopted every 
draft position.
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The prime minister’s role to date has been somewhat similar to 
that of the “remote” prime minister in Hungary, who was involved only 
in issues with a significant impact on daily politics. He is informed 
in a weekly cabinet meeting where EU business is the first item on 
the agenda (expert interview). However, according to the experiences 
above, with increasing dynamics and a growing agenda the prime min-
ister might see the necessity of becoming more involved in negotia-
tions business.
The negotiating team consists of the fifteen negotiators, the Am-
bassador of the Mission of Croatia to the EU in Brussels (the mission) 
and is chaired by the Chief Negotiator and his two deputies. The Chief 
Negotiator manages the work of the working groups which participate 
in screening and draw up the draft proposals of negotiating positions. 
He has a dual role, which includes preparing the positions and negoti-
ating them directly with the Commission and the member states. The 
15 negotiators convene in the weekly “negotiators meeting” where the 
progress of negotiations is discussed (expert interview). As seen in the 
above examples, the line ministries have a rather indirect but power-
ful role as their practical expertise results in a leading technical posi-
tion and high representation among the working group members. Most 
of the higher-positioned members of the negotiation structure originate 
directly from the state administration or a state-affiliated agency. Out 
of fifteen negotiators, eleven come from state institutions, two from the 
scientific sector and two from economic interest groups. Among the 
thirty five working group leaders, this ratio amounts to 26:7:1, while 
one is self-employed (Vlada RH, 2005c). The selection of the negotia-
tors was largely based on criteria of membership in state administra-
tion and agencies, and did not exclude those with party alignment, as 
e.g. in Slovenia. Expert interviews confirmed that in some cases of se-
lecting the negotiators or working group leaders, it was not the person’s 
proficiency level but interpersonal contacts that were the decisive fac-
tors. Still, the European Commission has underlined the proficiency of 
the team on many occasions. Despite signs of party political involve-
ment in the establishment of the structure, it will probably be possible 
to keep party politics out of the negotiation team. By contrast, a bigger 
issue will be whether the negotiation team can be kept out of party poli-
tics in the long-run (see below). 
The Secretariat of the Negotiation Team is the focal point of 
process coordination and primarily provides technical and adminis-
trative support to the State Delegation, the Negotiating Team and the 
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working groups. It is led by an assistant minister of foreign affairs (di-
rectly responsible to the minister) who simultaneously acts as a nego-
tiator. Contacts within the Croatian negotiation structure are strictly 
channelled through the Secretariat which in some way plays the role 
of a “dating-service” in finding and connecting the responsible part-
ners between the institutions. It thus acts as network point for horizon-
tal contacts (e.g. between working groups and line ministries) as well 
as for the vertical communication with EU institutions in Brussels (ex-
pert interview). 
This system proved to be rigid in Slovenia and Estonia, where 
it led to time lags and other difficulties in the communication between 
the national administration and EU civil servants (which the Secretari-
at seeks to control). The Estonian case revealed that weak contacts be-
tween the line ministries or working groups and the EU administra-
tion can add to the emergence of isolated “islands of excellence” in 
the domestic administration. Despite the Secretariat’s determination to 
keep control of the information flow, direct and informal communica-
tion channels evolved between some of the structure’s bodies (e.g. be-
tween working group members and civil servants in Brussels), bypass-
ing the Secretariat as a result of pressures of time and the need to sim-
plify procedures.
All countries relied on institutionalising a formal or informal 
body for interest groups, representing union and employer organisa-
tions in the negotiation process. This body was in all cases limited to 
monitoring, spreading information and networking of interest groups 
with EU institutions in Brussels. In Croatia interest groups are not or-
ganised in an extra body, but instead send representatives to the Na-
tional Parliamentary Committee (however without voting rights). Even 
though interest groups seem to represent a large deal of the working 
group members, they are present within the structure and thus are “un-
der control” of the dominating state-associated actors.xii
The “National Committee for monitoring negotiations for acces-
sion to the EU” set up in Parliament is responsible for supervising and 
giving guidelines on the drafting of positions. It consists of the presi-
dents of the Committee of Foreign Affairs, the Committee of Europe-
an Integration, the Committee for Inter-parliamentary Co-operation as 
well as five representatives from the ruling and five from the opposi-
tion parties and decides by unanimous vote. Its additional members, the 
representatives of the President’s Office, the academic community, the 
unions and the employer associations have only observer status with-
out any voting rights. The chairperson of the Committee, who is a rep-
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resentative of the biggest opposition party in parliament, holds regular 
consultations with the president of the Republic, the prime minister, the 
president of Parliament, the head of the state delegation and the chief 
negotiator. 
Figure 4 Negotiation structure of Croatia
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draft position flow before adoption
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informal communication
Source: Vlada RH, 2005a; author´s interviews and illustration
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While in expert interviews committee members confirmed that 
the governmental information policy has been to date satisfactory, the 
chair expressed discontent with the fact that the Committee only receives 
“governmentally approved” information (Šarić, 2006). The Committee 
is not designed to play an independent controlling role since some of its 
members lack competence and dedication (ibid.), while the absence of 
significant technical and analytical capacities means it is impossible to 
counterbalance dependence on governmental resources.xiii 
The symptom of a weak parliament is reflected by the tight grip 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The structure’s design fits the needs 
of an ambitious timetable that does not allow for widespread discussion 
of potentially controversial issues. Yet, it should be kept in mind that 
flexibility (Estonia) and openness (Slovenia) proved to be important 
factors in successful negotiations. The concluding section will outline 
why it might be worthwhile considering a different strategic approach 
to negotiations, which would enable a more thorough, balanced and in-
tegrative approach.
CONSEQUENCES FOR THE INTEGRATION 
STRATEGY: QUICK ACCESSION OR GOOD 
REPRESENTATION?
The existing negotiation structure reflects the priorities of the 
integration strategy, originally devised in the context of government 
change in 2000, focusing on high integration speed. Since then, how-
ever, the background parameters have changed considerably. While 
then the possibility of joining the EU together with Romania and Bul-
garia seemed an ambitious but still attainable goal, this option is not 
open any more. Still, government and parliament plan to access the EU 
within a period of time shorter than that recorded by any new members 
to date.xiv Two trends, however, one domestic and one within the EU 
will put large constraints and question marks on the foreseen time ta-
ble.
On the domestic side, there is a silent preference for ignoring the 
widespread “euroscepticism” among Croatian citizens, while far-reach-
ing reforms will put even more stresses and strains on the population. 
Whereas in 2000 the levels of public support for European integration 
were encouraging, today polls show a rather unstable picture. This is 
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even more striking against the background of increasing trends of eu-
roscepticism which could be observed during the negotiation phase in 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Therefore, public concerns should 
be taken very seriously, considering the realistic option of an acces-
sion treaty being rejected by the population, as happened for instance 
in Norway.xv Yet, the only prevailing governmental measure to coun-
ter this stance seems to be pushing through negotiations as fast as pos-
sible.
At the same time, debates within the EU institutions and mem-
ber states on what is called “enlargement fatigue” reflect the decreasing 
level of public approval for further enlargement by states from (South) 
Eastern Europe. One important background reason lies in the unre-
solved problem of the EU’s internal decision structure still drawing on 
the EU-15 at the time of the Nice Summit in 2000. While attempts at 
reform failed with the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in France 
and the Netherlands, the EU will first need to adjust its decision-mak-
ing system to the enlarged Union before it is prepared to admit new 
members.xvi,xvii This is reflected in the debates on “enlargement capa-
city”, in which voices calling for freezing enlargement after the acce-
ssion of Bulgaria and Rumania find more and more acceptance.xviii Re-
solving this fundamental problem will require a difficult and probably 
long process in which public opinion in the member states will play a 
decisive role. In this context the lessons of the rejection of the Constitu-
tional Treaty as a project imposed “top-down” should illustrate the dan-
ger of political elites ignoring adequate electorate representation and 
failing to generate the legitimacy necessary to engage in such large 
scale reform. 
The overall focus on quick accession at any cost is part of the 
dominating norms that govern enlargement. This focus rests on the 
shaky presumption that a slower tempo would endanger the whole tran-
sition process. On the contrary, however, especially small states in the 
past lacked the capacity to meet the tight timetable and to draft qualita-
tive reform. In the case of Estonia “the overload and time pressure were 
major reasons for the poor quality of legislation and insufficient policy 
analysis” (Raik, 2004:588), while Ágh (1998) sees the management of 
EU accession in CEE as “a typical case of state or government over-
load, therefore it has been […] politically counterproductive [...]”. The 
above mentioned development in Croatia, with the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs showing signs of problems with coordination capacity through 
the declining number of laws harmonised should be seen in this con-
text.
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At a more basic level the persisting “need for speed” of the ac-
cession strategy collides with the goal of fostering democracy (see, 
among others: Beichelt, 2003) by exerting pressures to streamline the 
domestic negotiation process, rendering it the “hour of the executive” 
(Lippert [et al.], 2001:994). Consequently, the democratic deficitxix of 
the EU institutional system, itself overloaded with executive decision 
power, weak parliamentary control and long legitimacy chainsxx (for 
an overview see: Føllesdal, 2004) is being exported to Croatia – rather 
silently, in the form of adaptation pressures to the EU decision making 
process.xxi This in turn happens at the risk of sacrificing participation 
and control of the stakeholders concerned, above all citizens and their 
parliamentary representatives. 
This problem was partially addressed by the establishment of 
the National Committee.xxii As seen above, however, this body has no 
veto power and rather resembles a “debate club”. This is in line with 
the Parliament’s “traditional” politically marginalised position in the 
political system, despite the improvements in the last decade (Zakošek, 
2002:90). Its weak integration in the accession process continues this 
tradition by respective path-dependencies, similar to the Hungarian 
prime minister’s claim that “in practice it is frequently not the Parlia-
ment that is controlling government, but the reverse” (cited after Bes-
senyey Williams, 2001:31). xxiii 
While older member states were able to develop mechanisms of 
national parliamentary scrutiny of the government incrementally as re-
sponses to step-by-step European integration, accession countries like 
Croatia have to adapt to the political system of the EU in a very short 
time. This, however, does not leave room for a responsive adaptation of 
legislative control, as path-dependent institutional processes require a 
wider time horizon. At the same time, effective national parliamentary 
scrutiny is the most important institutional mode of controlling the gov-
ernment in order to provide for representation and legitimacy. Effective 
scrutiny in turn is largely dependent on the domestic political system 
and the general strength of parliament, which is, as pointed out above, 
quite weak in Croatia (for a discussion of conditions for effective scru-
tiny, see Raunio, 2005).
In turn, low degree of responsibility vested in parliamentary rep-
resentatives in the negotiation process will lead to temptations to abuse 
negotiation issues by politicisation instead of problem focused discus-
sion. The National Committee’s alleged strength – its political weight 
reflected by its overwhelming composition of high-ranking party rep-
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resentatives – might also be its greatest weakness. Party politicians will 
hardly miss the chance to compete in defending alleged “national” in-
terests when they are not made responsible for real decisions over ne-
gotiating positions. This is significantly reinforced by the construction 
of the National Committee with very limited access to independent ex-
pertise and the obligation to reach a unanimous vote. 
The conflict potential has already been demonstrated by severe 
political fights between the two big parties, which led to several anno-
uncements of the opposition leader to withdraw support from the Na-
tional Committee. Considering the still early stage of the negotiations 
it seems doubtful that party political quarrelling over negotiating posi-
tions will not be transported into parliament. These dissensions, togeth-
er with a widespread popular perception of the legislature as merely a 
“law-passing machine”, have led to further recoil from “politics” and 
a reinforcement of ongoing delegitimation trends.xxiv Research in this 
field suggests that euroscepticism among Croatian voters can to a sig-
nificant part be traced back to distrust in national institutions, especial-
ly parliament (Štulhofer, 2006). Its preparedness neither effectively to 
control the government in the process of negotiations nor adequately to 
represent the citizens might reinforce this vicious circle and render it a 
mere “facade of democracy” (Rüb, 2001:47).
In light of these arguments, a change in accession management 
should be considered; such a change might have the following ele-
ments:
•  Turn away from an “as soon as possible” to an “as soon as ready” 
policy. Encouraging though an ambitious entry date might be, in the 
present situation it seems to overstrain both the citizens as well as 
the Union. It should be kept in mind that it is not EU membership it-
self that will solve pressing problems, rather the intense reform pe-
riod enabled by the “window of opportunity” and the unique dynam-
ics of the accession period, which should be used as a self-disciplin-
ing instrument. Shortening this period means less time available for 
designing reforms, for sequencing them and to implement them in 
a socially bearable way. Eventually rising scepticism in the EU to-
wards further enlargement should not lead to hectic reactions but to 
a display of determination by more thorough reforms combined with 
high-level political lobbying.
•  Turn away from a top-down to a more bottom-up centred approach 
by installing a parliamentary veto point. It should not be forgotten 
that legitimacy requires control of the citizens over political proce-
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sses and their contents – a control that needs to be “substantive rather 
than symbolic” (Dryzek, 2000:79ff.). A parliament effectively con-
trolling government could play an important role in channelling the 
(often diffuse) eurosceptical attitude of many citizens, returning le-
gitimacy and reintegrating a large part of the society in Croatia’s way 
to the EU. Furthermore, this approach reduces probable, very damag-
ing party politicisation tendencies by making representatives respon-
sible and forcing them to let their words follow deeds.
•  Internalise European Affairs. In the Croatian political system Euro-
pean integration is still treated like a foreign policy issue where tra-
ditionally weak or no legislative control is exerted and the role of 
the parliament lies mostly in ratifying of international treaties. As the 
above experiences in the accession process suggest, European inte-
gration issues are domestic issues, since the decisions made in Brus-
sels will sometime override those made in Zagreb. Thus, the National 
Committee in Parliament should be upgraded to a grand committee 
with open meetings, sector specific sub committees, as well as ade-
quate resources and analytical support. 
•  Reconsider the tight grip of governmental control rendering negotia-
tion management more transparent and flexible. This entails: (i) Im-
proving conditions for “negotiations at home” by enhancing system-
atic participation and integration of interest groups, actors from the 
field of science or other concerned stakeholders and (ii) Lessening 
rigid process coordination allowing for more flexible contacts be-
tween the national and the EU level, thus avoiding the emergence of 
“islands of excellence”. At the same time all informal communica-
tion needs to be recorded in order to avoid loss of information to the 
organisation.
*  I would like to thank Katarina Ott and two anonymous reviewers for improving this 
article by providing helpful comments and suggestions.
i  In this paper it is implicitly assumed that accession to the EU is desirable.
ii  The cases for the comparative analysis were picked on the grounds of a comparative 
research project “Organising for EU Enlargement: A Challenge for the Member 
States and the Candidate States (′Managing Europe From Home′)”, a six-country 
comparative study on the impact of the EU on structures and processes of national 
public policy carried out under the EU Framework V Programme (see: http://www.
oeue.net/). For the purpose of this article a number of studies on candidate states 
were used to depict accession management in order to beneﬁt from the uniform
methodological approach applied in all three cases.
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iii  For that purpose in-depth expert interviews were held in January and February 
2006 with individuals from all levels of the negotiation structure and the National 
Committee in Parliament, ranging from working group members via high ranking 
senior civil servants to politicians. The names of the interviewees will not be 
exhibited in this article but are known to the author.
iv  As such, Raik (2004:567) identiﬁes for instance inevitability, speed, efﬁciency and
expertise.
v  This is especially underlined by the Hungarian experience where the actual 
difference between the national and the EU level disappeared in course of 
negotiations, rendering the EU “another stakeholder (but a powerful one) in the 
national negotiations in formulating the Hungarian government’s negotiating 
position” (Pálvölgyi et al., 2003:22).
vi  In order to structure the cross-national analysis, a difference will be made between 
process and policy coordination (for similar distinctions, see: Brusis, 2000:12; 
Davis, 1997:126ff.). Process coordination means the management of procedures and 
the integration of the most important actors at the speciﬁc stage of the negotiation
process. Policy coordination entails strategic policy formulation and “political” 
coordination as maintaining functionality of coordinated bodies.
vii  While Prime Minister Mart Laar (in ofﬁce 1999-2002) had to outbalance a
foreign minister who was member of a different party, his successor Siim Kallas 
was member of the same party as the chief diplomat and thus able to concentrate 
more on negotiation issues. Still, even in Laar’s term, the role of the prime minister 
continuously increased reaching its peak in 2002.
viii  For example, civil society and independent experts were explicitly invited to co-
operate in the formulation of the draft positions.
ix  In this article, only the management structure relevant for accession negotiations 
(under Prime Minister Orbán) will be referred to. 
x  In course of reorganisation in 2002 it was renamed State Secretariat for Integration 
and External Economic Relations.
xi  It has to be noted that at the time of writing this article (February/March 2006) the 
structure has not yet become fully functional. At the same time, experience with past 
management forms shows that changes within the institutional conﬁguration can
(and probably will) occur within the negotiation process, either through political 
decisions (e.g. changes in government) or informal developments leading to quasi 
facts. Yet its theoretical design alone and experiences made during the ﬁrst screening
sessions provide for a clear picture of the structure’s core features.
xii  According to the report of the chief negotiator to the government (Vlada Republike 
Hrvatske, 2005b:2), from 1,591 people in the working groups, 701 are “not in the 
system of state administration”. Still, it has to be taken into account that some of 
the 701 non-civil servants come from scientiﬁc institutions, thus leaving the exact
origins of the working group members unclear. It might be interesting to note that 
869 members alone are dealing with the chapters connected to agriculture.
xiii  To date there is only one secretary employed while for the future, ﬁve further
employee positions are planned (expert interview). Yet, this still will not make up for 
the lack of supportive expertise.
xiv  The government expects to ﬁnish negotiations speedier than the candidates from the
last round because of policy and institutional learning and the share of the acquis 
already transposed. It plans to close all negotiation chapters by the end of 2007 in 
order for Croatia to take part in elections for the European parliament in 2009.
xv  In Norway’s referendum in November 1994 the accession treaty was narrowly 
rejected (47.7% in favour).
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xvi  With the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty, also the “Protocol on the Role of 
National Parliaments in the European Union” was rejected, which provided for 
stronger information rights, their participation in a “ﬁrst reading” of EU proposals
and a “subsidiarity control” which even included a veto right under certain 
conditions.
xvii  France and Germany already stated their preference for deepening to further 
enlargement, while Germany showed some signs of a changed approach towards 
the accession of the “Western Balkans” by applying its concept of a “privileged 
partnership”, originally invented for labelling its preferred mode of relations with 
Turkey. 
xviii  “Enlargement capacity” was to date a merely theoretical aspect of the Copenhagen 
criteria deﬁning the basic conditions for accession to the EU. This concept played a
big role in the amendment of the 2005 enlargement strategy of the Union (Commission, 
2005b) by a report from the European Parliament from mid-march 2006 (European 
Parliament, 2006). There it is stated that the EU is only able to admit new members 
if they can be integrated as well. According to the report, this situation is not given 
at the moment. Having in mind the development of the discussion on enlargement, 
only progress in EU deepening will allow for progress in enlargement.
xix  As differentiated by Scharpf (1996), this democratic deﬁcit is being discussed for the
European and the national level.
xx  The term “legitimacy chain” describes the chain between those making decisions and 
those being affected by them. Critics point out that this link between the sovereign on 
national and political actors on EU level is too long and non-transparent.
xxi  The mechanisms for this export are emulation (“copying” EU institutions) and 
conditionality (EU requirements favouring institutional modes that give preference 
to executives). Examples for a mixture of both are the institutional consequences 
emerging out of the SAA. Its governing bodies are the Association Council 
(political decision body governed by high executive ofﬁcials) and the Association
Committee (civil servants from respective ministries) whereas the third body, the 
Joint Association Parliamentary Committee just makes non-binding proposals to the 
Association Council.
xxii  The decision about the establishment of the Committee was made after few minutes 
of debate in a late parliamentary session. In a ﬁfteen minutes break the party leaders,
the prime minister, the foreign minister and the chief negotiator made the decision 
behind closed doors and thus gave a blow to representatives who pledged to call 
an extra morning session in order to discuss the issue extensively (Hrvatski Sabor, 
2005c).
xxiii  In the context of discussion on countering the democratic deﬁcit on EU and national
level, stronger national parliaments (of member states) are usually connected with 
intergovernmental models of European Integration, which also include strong 
national governments and a strong Council of Ministers. The opposite model of 
parliamentarisation includes strengthening European-level actors, like the European 
Parliament and the Commission. As this article refers to the pre-accession period, 
arguments for strengthening the national parliament are not supposed to provoke 
connotations with the intergovernmental perspective.
xxiv  In this context, there is evidence that satisfaction with democracy is higher in 
consensual democracies, where input from opposition parties is included by the 
government (see Anderson et al., 1997).
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